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 BHUTAN IN 1995
 Weathering the Storm
 Michael Hutt
 The Economy
 Bhutan's nonagricultural economy still centers on gov-
 ernment investment and a handful of larger companies. Over 80% of the
 population are farmers, but agriculture, forestry, and fishing have now de-
 creased to some 46% of GDP, mainly because of the development of hydro-
 power (HEP) since 1986. The bulk of Bhutan's external trade is with India,
 and the main trading agreement between the two countries was enhanced in
 February. Electricity from the HEP plant at Chhukha now accounts for 40%
 of Bhutan's trade with India, and in April the unit price of electricity from
 Chhukha was increased, to raise an extra $5.9 million per annum. Further
 hydro-power projects are in progress or at the planning stage, including the
 Basochhu Project, which is the largest single project supported by Austria in
 a developing country. A smaller HEP project, the $4.34 million Rangjung
 Project, came on stream in December 1995, and Bhutan and India are cur-
 rently discussing plans for the Chhukha II and III schemes (the Tala HEP and
 Wangchu reservoir projects), which will have a combined capacity of 1,020
 megawatts. Bhutan's capacity to consume electricity remains tiny because
 the industrial base is small: Bhutan's largest factory, owned by Bhutan Ferro
 Alloys Ltd., began production of ferro silicon and micro silica in April 1995,
 with a workforce of 355.
 Foreign Aid and Foreign Relations
 Bhutan's relationship with India remains intimate and crucial, as India retains
 a guiding hand on Bhutan's foreign relations and is its main aid donor and
 trading partner. Indian assistance is expected to increase to slightly over half
 Michael Hutt is Lecturer, School of Oriental and African Studies, Uni-
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 of total foreign aid to Bhutan in 1995-96. In January the funding shortfall for
 Bhutan's Seventh Plan (1992-97) was anticipated to amount to $142 million,
 and at a Round Table Meeting at Geneva foreign donors pledged only $75
 million. This had severe effects on the Human Resources Development sec-
 tor, where a requirement of 9,500 training fellowships had to be pared down
 to 2,162. However, the Bhutanese government recorded that 98.3% of recur-
 rent expenditure had been met by domestic revenue during 1994-95. Rela-
 tions with China are cordial, and the main forum for dialogue since 1984 has
 been ten rounds of negotiations on the demarcation of Bhutan's northern
 boundary.
 Negotiations with Nepal
 During 1995 Bhutan found it increasingly difficult to explain away the pres-
 ence of 88,000 people in refugee camps on Nepalese soil. The refugees claim
 to have been evicted from their homes in southern Bhutan, and the majority
 hold documentary evidence of long-term residence in the kingdom; most
 have lived in the camps for over three years. A Ministerial Joint Commission
 (MJC) was set up by the governments of Bhutan and Nepal in 1993 to ad-
 dress this problem. Its fifth round of talks was held in Kathmandu in Febru-
 ary-March 1995, and its sixth in Thimphu in April. The minority United
 Marxist-Leninist (UML) government elected in Nepal in November 1994 in-
 herited a commitment to harmonize its position with the Bhutanese govern-
 ment on four agreed categories of people in the camps: (1) "bonafide
 Bhutanese if [they] have been evicted forcefully" (2) "Bhutanese who emi-
 grated" (3) "non-Bhutanese people" and (4) "Bhutanese who have committed
 criminal acts." The two rounds of talks had few tangible outcomes and no
 date was set for a further round when the two sides parted company in April.
 The Commission did exchange the names of people from each side who
 would make up a Joint Verification team to begin the job of categorizing the
 refugees, but each side blamed the other for the lack in further progress. The
 Bhutanese home minister said that the Nepalese side had "changed its posi-
 tion" and "introduced new issues," and wanted to repatriate "all the people in
 the camps" to Bhutan, while the Nepalese home minister said that Bhutan
 should "repatriate all those in the camps who are from Bhutan." A large
 number of the people in the camps had signed "voluntary emigration" forms
 before leaving Bhutan, and it is probable that the Nepalese side in the MJC
 feared such people were in danger of falling into Category 2, without any
 consideration of whether or not they had signed under duress. In September
 the UML fell from power, and it remains to be seen how the new coalition
 government in Nepal will handle this issue.
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 Political Developments
 Political Dissent: The Detention of Tek Nath Rizal
 Tek Nath Rizal, a royal advisory councillor, submitted a petition to the king
 of Bhutan in April 1988, which had been drafted with the help of seven other
 senior Lhotshampa (Nepali, Bhutanese) bureaucrats, and it asked the king to
 reconsider the 1985 Citizenship Act and the census exercise that had been
 underway for some months in southern districts. Rizal was arrested and then
 released with instructions not to meet with more than three other persons at
 any one time. Soon afterward, he fled with his family to Nepal where he
 helped to set up a human rights organization in exile. Rizal was seized by
 Nepalese police on November 15, 1989, handed over to the Bhutanese secur-
 ity forces, and flown back to Bhutan. He was kept in solitary confinement in
 Bhutan until December 1992; tried during 1993 on charges based mainly on
 the National Security Act that came into force in November 1992; sentenced
 to life imprisonment for treason on November 16, 1993; and then granted a
 conditional, deferred pardon by the king three days later. The pardon was
 conditional upon the two governments finding a solution to the "problem of
 the people living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal." Rizal was adopted by
 Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience in 1990, and the legality of
 his detention and subsequent life sentence remain key issues in the war of
 words between the Bhutanese government and its opponents in exile.
 In March 1995 the United Nations' Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
 released a report on a visit it had made to Bhutan in October 1994. This
 report was chiefly concerned with the detention of Rizal, and stated in its
 conclusion that "the arrest of T. N. Rizal cannot be said to be arbitrary," and
 that his trial was fair. The reaction to these assertions was predictably mixed:
 Dasho Jigmi Thinley, Bhutan's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva,
 praised the Group for its "professional objectivity" and for the "methodical
 manner" in which it had conducted its investigations. The Kathmandu-based
 Human Rights Organization of Bhutan, on the other hand, claimed that the
 report contained many serious errors and contradictions and described it as an
 "outrage" that deserved "condemnation and denunciation in the most em-
 phatic terms."
 The Druk National Congress
 The Druk National Congress (DNC), founded by a group of Sharchhop (east-
 ern Bhutanese) dissidents in Kathmandu in 1994, is led by a well-known
 Sharchhop businessman, Rongthong Kunley Dorji. DNC therefore represents
 the only group in active opposition to the Bhutanese government whose
 membership does not consist of Lhotshampas. On May 28, according to the
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 Bhutan Review, DNC posters appeared on important buildings in many towns
 in Bhutan. Nine demands were made-respect for human rights, an in-
 dependent judiciary, freedom of opinion and expression, an end to forced
 labor, etc. It is impossible to gauge whether the DNC's campaign reflects a
 widely held aspiration. However, the extent to which its leader was vilified
 in Bhutan's National Assembly may be significant. The arrest in July and
 subsequent jailing of the royal Bhutan police chief, ostensibly for allowing
 prisoners to escape from Chemgang jail, also may be related to this issue.
 The National Assembly
 The National Assembly met for its 73rd session from August 10 to Septem-
 ber 2. This was the first meeting of the Assembly since July 1993, despite
 the requirement that the Assembly should meet at least once a year. The
 speaker informed the Assembly that no session had been called during 1994
 because many of the points submitted for discussion had been about the
 ongoing talks between Bhutan and Nepal and that this would have had a
 negative impact on those talks. He went on to declare that now, however, the
 Nepalese government was "not interested in the bilateral talks," implying that
 any negative impact would now be of little consequence.
 Speakers from the floor of the National Assembly dismissed all forms of
 dissent with contempt. Particular scorn was poured on Rongthong Kunley:
 the people's representatives condemned him for "spreading false and mali-
 cious allegations against the Royal Government of Bhutan" and asked the
 royal government to "extradite Rongthong Kinley following which he must
 be given capital punishment." They virtually denied that anyone had been
 evicted forcibly from Bhutan, and some representatives argued that the royal
 government should "not even discuss the question of allowing any of the
 people in the refugee camps . . . to come to Bhutan." They viewed the rela-
 tives of refugees still living in Bhutan with mistrust, arguing that they should
 be dismissed from government service or even expelled from the country. As
 on previous occasions, the king and the ministers took a more moderate line,
 restating their commitment to negotiations with Nepal.
 The Bhutanese government tends to present the ethnic crisis as one of inse-
 curity and "terrorism" in its southern districts because villagers there are rou-
 tinely robbed and harrassed, both by criminal elements from the refugee
 camps and incomers from across the Indian border. The National Assembly
 resolved to discuss with the Indian authorities the matter of Bodo militancy in
 Assam spilling over the southern border. As well as debating developmental
 and budgetary matters, the Assembly also pressed for heavy punishments to
 be meted out to persons who desecrated and robbed religious monuments,
 reflecting a widespread concern in Bhutan about the need for cultural preser-
 vation.
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 Conclusion
 During the 1980s a new, more exclusive kind of ethnic nationalism began to
 exert an influence over policymaking in Bhutan. It began to be seen as axio-
 matic that Bhutan could no longer afford to consist of a northern and a south-
 ern sector whose populations lived in separate cultural spheres and with only
 limited interaction with one another. Nepali-led political activism of which
 there existed a very stark example in Darjeeling between 1986 and 1988
 came to be seen as a major threat to the future of the Drukpa state. Thus, the
 southern Bhutanese were given a choice between subscribing actively and
 visibly to the Drukpa cultural and political ethos or rebelling against it and
 losing their rights to citizenship as a consequence. The tone of the recent
 National Assembly session suggests that Bhutan is determined to weather the
 storm with few compromises, and so far it has carried most foreign donors
 with it. In the longer term, few "bonafide Bhutanese" who "have been
 evicted forcibly" are likely to return to Bhutan unless some measure of polit-
 ical reform occurs within the kingdom.
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